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Decolonisation: African Political thought

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Abstract

African political thought is fundamentally rooted in African heritage and culture. It is a frontal assault against the imperial powers of Great Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, and the Union of South Africa, which denied the diverse African peoples of their right to self-government. Thus, the political concepts of African leaders at various times and places were intended to be last attacks against the denial of the basic human rights of the people. At the period, political thinking centred on two major threats to African states and the continent: colonialism and racism. In African Political Thought, the notion of Decolonization is best investigated and analysed in the context of its processes. Any attention that was paid to the African past highlighted the savage character of intergroup interactions. As colonial education was influenced by the need to explain the ills of colonialism, African history was filled with European discoveries of Africa. In order to rectify this anomaly, the concepts of Pan-Africanism and Negritude were developed within an African setting. These concepts aided in reinforcing the significance of African heritage despite the European invasion. This research seeks to investigate the origins of African political philosophy and the decolonization process in certain African locations. The major source of data collecting is secondary sources.

Keywords— Decolonisation, Africa, Political Thought, Pan-Africanism, Negritude

1. INTRODUCTION

Imperialism, especially in the 16th to mid-20th centuries, structured world order starkly around the dominance principle, with masters and slaves, conquerors and conquered peoples with their land, labour, and territories. For Europeans the 1880s was the decade of the scramble for Africa. Between 1875 and 1889 with the tempo of events steadily mounting in the mid-1880s, the major powers of Western Europe established political claims to many parts of Africa in most of which they had shown no previous interest. (Osadola, 2012)

As late as 1950 most of Africa was still under the control of European powers. Britain was dominant in much of West, East and South Africa. In addition, she governed directly the Gold Coast, Nigeria, Kenya and the Rhodesia's. France was still in control of Morocco and Tunisia as well as Algeria, which was technically a part of metropolitan France. Portugal controlled the vast areas of Angola and Mozambique. Spain possessed the Spanish Sahara and other pockets in the north-western part of the continent. By the end of the decade the process of decolonisation was almost completed. The unscrambling of the major European empires in Africa was proceeding as swiftly and to many observers as unexpectedly as the original scramble for African territory was done.

The concept of Decolonisation in African Political Thought can best be examined and analysed in the context of its processes (Ayoade & Adigun, 1989).Whatever concern was given at all to the African past emphasised the barbaric nature of inter-group relations (the so called ethnic wars) paganism, and human sacrifice, etc. besides, where notice was taken of
Africa civilisations like those of Egypt, Ethiopia, and even the empire-building in Western Sudan, these were attributable to the Hamites and the Semites of European or Asian stock who had supposedly brought ‘civilisation’ to Africa. As colonial education was informed by the necessity of justifying the evils of colonialism, African history taught in schools was replete with European discoveries of Africa.

This was the unfortunate state which pioneer African political historian scholars encountered. At the time they emerged in the early 1950s, however, strong anti-colonial sentiments and ideologies had been instrumental in shaping such concepts as “Pan Africanism,” Nationalism,” “African Personality,’ and “Negritude.” The period marked the dawn of an emergent Africanism (Eghosa, 1991). As Ekeh (1991) puts it, the African ruling class “accepts the principles implicit in colonialism but it rejects the foreign personnel that ruled Africa. In order to replace the coloniser and rule its own people, it has invented a number of self-interest begotten theories to justify that rule. It is these ‘theories’ that today form the major substance of African Political Thought.

II. COLONIALISM AND ROOT OF AFRICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

It has been argued that the body of idea which is collectively labeled African political thought is essentially a product of the colonial process and the anti-colonial reactions to it by the first-order African elites who have today become African political thinkers (Eghosa, 1991). This argument does not in anyway appear to be novel, particularly from the point of view of those colonial apologists and their cohorts, mostly of racial variety, who are quick to deny the existence of any autochthonous African system of thought before the advent of European colonization (Fortes & Evans-Pritchard, 1940). Fortes and Evans-Pritchard have, for example, argued that “Africans...do not analyse their social system, they live it. They think and feel about it in terms of values which reflect in doctrine and symbol, but do not explain, the forces that really control their social behavior.”

One immediately recognizes that it is the very fact of this denial that has led most Africanists to argue that colonialism did not bring Africa or its system of thought. The result is that, in the general euphoria of establishing an Africanness, Africanists deny colonialism its proper place and create a veil over the actual contributions of the colonial situations to the development of what may aptly be called modern African political thought.

The point must be made at this stage that most Africanists who point to original African initiatives and autochthony of thought in pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial times glorify the African past and pretend, as it were, that the roots of modern African thought are to be found in the glorious past. In such a scheme, colonialism becomes just one of those other experience like the rise and fall of old empires, ageless inter-group relations, religious beliefs, indigenous socio-political organisations, etc. as such it is argued, its contribution to the development of African thought must, indeed, be seen as part of an overarching whole which is essentially African, rather than a prime factor in the development of African thought (Eghosa, 1991).

A convenient starting point in considering the place of colonialism in African political thought is to examine the issue of whether colonialism in Africa was an ‘episode’ or an ‘epoch’. To fully understand the issues involved in the contending paradigms, we shall examine in some detail the positions of the two schools of thought.

The episodic school, championed by pioneer African historians like Dike, Ade Ajayi, and Ogot, and given institutional representation by the Ibadan school of African history, emerged in the first-order generation of Africanist historians who had, as it were, to rewrite and reconstruct African history, emphasising in the process that Africa, contrary to what the colonisers made us believe, had a glorious pre-colonial past (Dike, 1956; Ade Ajayi, 1968; Ogot, 1967). Before this time, the racial argument that the whites were the master race who had come to shoulder the responsibility of ‘civilising’ a barbaric and unknown Africa, peopled for the most part by an inferior black race, had been advanced to justify the colonisation of Africa. It was argued that until the advent of the Europeans, the Africans had no history of note, were preliterate and, indeed, were in a ‘dark continent’.

Even as recently as 1830/31, the celebrated philosopher, Hegel had dismissed Africa as an irrelevant part of the world:

“At this point, we leave Africa not to mention it again. For it is no historical part of the world: it has no movement or development to exhibit...what we properly understand by Africa is the unhistorical,
underdeveloped spirit, still involved in the conditions of mere nature, which had to be presented here only as on the threshold of the world's history” (Hegel, 1963).

Colonial anthropologists based their studies on this kind of unsavory and degrading assertions. These anthropologists did well to assert that African history did not predate the African contact with the Europeans. Basically descriptive in their method, they ignored African initiative before and during colonialism, particularly the spate of resistance movements against European colonialism. Whatever concern was given at all to the African past emphasised the barbaric nature of inter-group relations, the so-called tribal wars, paganism, and human sacrifices. As colonial education was informed by the necessity of justifying the evils of colonialism, African history taught in schools was replete with European discourses of Africa. As products of this era, Africanists at the time turned inward to glorify the African past. They reminded us that in the pre-colonial times, the famous empires of Ghana, Mali, Songhai, Benin and Oyo, among others, flourished and that warriors like Chaka of Zululand, Jaja of Opobo, and others waged fierce wars against European domination. These, and many more, were resurrected to counteract the denying effects of colonialism.

Taking dates and periodisation as strong virtues in historiography, the proponents of the Ibadan school of history reasonably reckoned that if colonialism lasted for only about seventy-five years (from 1885, the years of partition, to 1960, the general year of independence for most of Africa), then, of course, in the context of Africa’s long history, it would count for far less than is commonly claimed for it. Many criticisms have been levelled against the episodic school. It emphasis on dates and periods, it is said, distorts the reality of the colonial situation because as (Ekeh, 1991) has argued, the major developments in colonialism shade across the dates of historiography. For example, to take 1885 as the effective date of colonisation is to undermine the profound effects of earlier Euro-African contacts, particularly in the slave trade and evangelisation. With particular regard to the slave trade, it is not generally recognised, or the point is underplayed, that the trade accounted for the emergence of new power groups in pre-colonial Africa states, as new opportunities for status and wealth offered themselves, these emergent power variables in part account for the glories claimed for some of the old African empires.

The colonial imprint must however be seen beyond the colonial situation. This is where African scholars with epochal view score their greatest intellectual victory. Sklar commented that it “marks a significant breakthrough toward post-colonial freedom in political thought and analysis because it acknowledges that colonialism produced enduring social formations” (Sklar, 1985). Colonialism, then, is an epoch, comparable to such dominant world epochs as the industrial revolution and French revolution. Like these other much more famous epochs, colonialism produced in Africa profound qualitative and supra-individual social changes, introduced massive and enduring social formations, and consolidated social structures. In addition, the significance of its structures has outlived the colonial epoch itself, and it has integrated Africa into the world system. The point is that since colonialism, things have fallen apart, and post-colonial Africa bears little or no qualitative resemblance to the pre-colonial past. This certainly has to be the case, because with colonialism came the sacking of empires, segmentary and non centralised societies, and their replacement by new states which were mostly artificial creations of the colonial masters; with colonialism came the introduction of western institutions and processes of government.

Christianity, the one-man-one wife maxim of western societies, the monetisation of the economy and attendant capitalism which emphasises the exploitation of raw materials for the colonialist metropoles, and, of course, the underdevelopment of Africa in the world capitalist system. Surely with all these transformations, which constitute realities of post-colonial Africa, colonialism cannot be just one of those other episodes in African political thought and history.

Ekeh classifies the social formations resulting from the colonial epoch into three. First, the “transformed indigenous social structures”, which, though they existed in the pre-colonial past, have taken on new symbolism and meanings in the changed milieu of colonialism. One important example here is chieftancy and kingship under colonial rule, most traditional authorities had their powers increased, even to dictatorial levels, and in places where centralised authorities did not previously exist, “warrant chiefs” were appointed to foster colonial administration.

The second type of colonial social formations is the “migrated social structures” which were imported wholesale from the mother-colony countries. These include the western models of democracy, the rule of law, bureaucracy, universities, etc., which, to a very
large extent, have developed a unique African feature from colonial times. Of particular importance is the fact that these institutions have lost their moral content which exists in their western forms. This explains the spate of corruption and other vices which attend migrated political institutions in Africa. Furthermore, devoid of the moral and ethical impetus for self-refinement and expansion which attend them in Europe, these institutions and processes are generally immobile because of the organisational fixation, as the Africans seek to keep the inherited traditions intact, ostensibly for excellence, at a time when their prototype in Europe have advanced in positive directions.

Thirdly, these are the “emergent social structures” which were neither indigenous to Africa nor migrated from the colonial centers. Rather, they emerged and developed, as it were, with colonialism “to meet societal needs which indigenous social structures and the migrated social structures could not fulfill in the new colonial environment.” These emergent structures have further distinctions: while the indigenous and migrated structures are mostly formal, emergent structures are informal and, secondly, they have an imprint of both tradition and modernity. The best examples of such structures are the ethnic groups and ethnicity which have since emerged.

As Raymond Apthorpe tells us, “what happened was that the colonial regimes administratively created tribes as we think of them today...for example, he points out, the Buluhyia of Western Kenya emerged between 1935 and 1945 as a ‘tribe’ in the form of a colonial administrative unit. Similarly, Thomas Hodgkin has pointed out that “everyone recognises that the notion of “being a Nigerian” is a new kind of conception. But it would seem that the notion of ‘being a Yoruba’ is not very much older. Obviously then, the present states of Africa and the loyalties claimed for them are, like the new ethnic realities, emergent social structures.

What all these point to is that colonialism in Africa was an epoch rather than an episode. There are some who even claim that “Africa”, “Africaness”, and “Africans” are all products of colonialism. This means that colonialism fostered and created an African “sentiments of oneness”, to use Nyerere’s term. He further observes that,

“Africans all over the continent, without a word being spoken either from one individual to another or from one African country to another, looked at the European, looked at one another and knew that, in relation to the European, they were one”

Mazrui rightly contends that the logical conclusion of Nyerere’s view is that “it took colonialism to inform Africans that they were African” (Mazrui, 1963). While this may sound unsavory, it is nevertheless true that colonialism offered diverse peoples of the continent a rallying point for unity, a unity that has ever since come to clearly demarcate Africa and Africans from others. As Onige puts it, “the humiliating and provoking exposure of subject peoples to European colonialism created a common set of attitudes and a system of reactive anti-colonial thought characteristic of the African (Otite, 1978).

In the final analysis, we must accept that colonialism is an epoch not only because this way it is easy to establish the colonial imprint on Africa, but more importantly because it provides an insight into an understanding of post-colonial political thought in Africa. It marks an important paradigm in the search for the roots of ‘modern,’ that is, post-colonial African thought because, as Sklar puts it:

Until the centrality of colonialism, its ‘epochal’ nature and transformative influences have been deeply and objectively investigated by African scholars, the demon of colonialism- the psychology of dependence- cannot be exorcised from African political thought... (Sklar, 1985)

III. DECOLONISATION IN NORTH-WEST AFRICA: TUNISIA AND MOROCCO

Under French protection both Tunísia and Morocco retained a semblance of their historic personalities. Thus their experience of colonial rule differed markedly from that of other African territories where substantial states, such as Ashanti, Buganda, or the Caliphate of Sokoto, found themselves incorporated in entirely novel political structures. Clearly it was much easier for a citizen of Fez or of Tunis, living among the monuments of a noble past, to think of himself as a Moroccan or a Tunisian than it was for a man from Ashanti or Buganda to accept the notion of Ghanaian or Ugandan nationalism. Thus the national movement in...
the two French protectorates of the Maghrib was never weakened by the tribal divisions that affected the modern political development of other African territories containing elaborate polities with long historical traditions. Both Moroccans and Tunisians possessed a certain national consciousness at the time when they were first brought under colonial rule (Hallett Robin, 1974).

Particularly influential for the Maghrib was the teaching of the Amir Shakib Arslan, member of a noble Lebanese family and disciple of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammed Abdur. Arslan settled in Geneva in 1918 and lived there till his death in 1946. He was visited by many of the leading Maghribi politicians of the day and was able to achieve a wider circulation for his ideas through publication of a journal, La Nation arabe.

In Tunisia and Morocco the first modern nationalists were to be found among the prosperous urban bourgeoisie, a bourgeoisie whose members tended, as Charles Gallagher has pointed out to be conservative, property conscious, family-oriented, and deeply religious, and so to present a type very different from the “middle class, venturesome entrepreneur active in the great movements of post-Reformation Europe” (Gallagher, 1963, p.87). About 1930, members of a younger generation began to make their ideas felt. Under this new impulse nationalist sentiments spread first to the members of the petty bourgeoisie, then to the urban proletariat, and finally to the peasantry of the countryside, the tone of the nationalists becoming ever more vigorous, strident, and assured as the size of their following increased. This was a development common to many nationalist movements. But Moroccan and to a lesser extent Tunisia nationalism presented one unusual feature - the role in the nationalist movement played by the traditional ruler (Hallett, 1974).

As for the nationalist’s leaders, once they had decided to appeal to the masses, they found themselves in the position of the sorcerer’s apprentice who unleashes a force he is unable to control. Protests and mass demonstrations led to violent scenes, to repression, and to the arrest of the nationalist leaders. By 1939 with the nationalist parties banned, Allal al-Fasi exiled to Gabon and Baurguiba imprisoned in France, the colonial authorities could feel that they were fully in command at the situation.

The illusion of French omnipotence was shattered by their defeat in 1940 and by the Anglo-American invasion of North Africa in 1942. Early in 1943 Sidi Muhammad of Morocco had a meeting with Frank D. Roosevelt. In the course of their conversation, the American president left the young sultan in no doubt of his own anti-colonialist sentiments. Roused by Roosevelt’s words into conceiving a new future for his country, Sidi is said to have emerged from the interview a changed man. From henceforth he was to take an increasingly vigorous part in the nationalist struggle. As for the nationalist politicians, they too became aware of new opportunities. Early in 1944 the Istiqlal party was founded in Morocco; the party first manifesto contained a stirring and unequivocal demand for independence. In Tunisia, too, the last years of the war saw a revival of political activity, the return of Baurguiba and the establishment of new organisations well suited to support nationalist cause, including a vigorous body of trade unionists, the Union Generale Tunisienne du Travail.

While the French thought of the future of the protectorates in terms of co-sovereignty, hoping to devise a system that would allow the colon to retain a commanding position in local affairs, the nationalists were committed to outright independence. In these circumstances conflict was inevitable, but it was not until 1954 that really serious outbreaks of violence occurred. The disastrous deteriorations of the situation in the two protectorates occurred at a time when France was beset with other difficulties. French delegates were finding themselves increasingly isolated in the United Nations where Tunisia and Moroccan nationalists could count on many friends prepared to speak on their behalf. Eventually, following the initiative of Pierre Mendes, the French government, acting with a speed and boldness that nothing in its previous North Africa policy had led contemporaries to anticipate, concluded a series of agreements first with the Tunisian nationalists, then with the Moroccans. In March, 1956, the two protectorates recovered their position as independent states. Shortly afterwards the Spanish government terminated its protectorate over northern Morocco (Hallet, 1974).

IV. DECOLONISATION OF THE BRITISH WEST-AFRICA

In comparison with many other parts of the Afro-Asian world, British West Africa was relatively little affected by the turmoil of World War Two. Nevertheless for the steadily increasing groups of politically conscious men in Lagos, Freetown, and Accra the war brought some stimulating and disturbing experiences. The extraordinary sight of Englishmen, servicemen in transit through West Africa, doing menial jobs, the
ironic spectacle of British administrators denouncing racialism and imperialism— as practiced by their rivals, the Germans, the irksome sacrifices demanded by the war effort in the form of a shortage of consumer goods, and the stirring, hopeful affirmations of the Atlantic Charter.

For the 1940s and 1950s thousand West African soldiers who saw service with the allied armies in Ethiopia and Burma there was an even wider range of novel sensations. Once demolished, these ex-servicemen showed that their contacts with other peoples had led them in the words of an official report, to develop “a political and national consciousness.” Their familiarity with the hardship of life on their return home made for “a general communicable state of unrest” (report of the commission of enquiry into disturbances in the Gold Coast 1948, p. 682). West Africa intellectuals and ex-servicemen were not the only people to see the colonial situation in a new light.

No one in Britain could have predicted how swiftly the process of decolonisation would take place, “somewhere in West Africa within a century, within half a century—and what is that in the life of a people—a new African state will be born,” wrote a group of Englishmen, notably sympathetic to African aspirations, in an official report on higher education in West Africa published in 1945 (minority report of the commission on higher education in west Africa quoted in 1 Wallenstein, the road to independence: Ghana and the Ivory Coast, 1964, p.42). Not more than twelve years later the Gold Coast had achieved independence, and by 1965, with the transformation of the miniscule colony of Gambia into a sovereign state, the process of decolonisation was complete. (Oyewale & Osadola, 2018)

In retrospect the British disengagement from West Africa appears to have taken place in a remarkably smooth and ordered manner and in an atmosphere of great cordiality. In fact the course of events in Nigeria and the Gold Coast clearly indicated, the process of decolonisation was accompanied with many unexpected twists of fortune. Fortunately for the British, the features which complicated their withdrawal from the colonial territories—consideration of the strategic importance and the presence of British settlers—did not affect the West Africa. And the British enjoyed an inestimable advantage over other colonial powers in having at their disposal a great deal of practical experience relating to the process of decolonisation.

There are many skeptics who argued that the institutions evolved over many centuries to suit a particular European society could not possibly be transferred effectively to other peoples of alien culture, who doubted whether Africans possessed the experience, or even the capacity, needed to manage the complicated machinery of a modern state, or who wondered how colonies made up of a wide variety of mutually hostile ethnic groups could ever be effectively transformed into modern nations. Decision-makers, both in Britain and in West Africa, could not afford to be mesmerized into inaction by such reflections.

By 1948, West African nationalism had developed in the Gold Coast and in Nigeria into a force that could be held in check by a massive show of counterforce—a line of action the British, with no vital interests at state, were not prepared to consider. In these circumstances there was no alternative but to apply the formula of the ‘Westminster model’.

In no West African territory was the transfer of power beset with as many difficulties as in Nigeria. This was hardly surprising. The country possessed a population—put at thirty-five million in the 1953 census—at once far larger and considerably more polities—heterogeneous than that of any other European colony in Africa. Over an extraordinarily varied conglomeration of older polities—the ancient kingdoms of Benin and Bornu, the Caliphate of Sokoto, the warring Yoruba states, Ibo village groups, and a multitude of smaller units—the British had erected the superstructure of colonial administration. In the past sixty years much had been done to modernise native systems of government at local levels. But the British had been exceedingly reluctant to allow Nigerians to participate in the work of government at the regional or national level. Relatively few local men barely exceeding hundred in 1945 had succeeded in entering the higher ranks of the civil service, and the country’s legislative council drew its four elected members from Lagos and Calabar, leaving the other parts of the country to be represented only by European officials whose presence in the legislature ensured the government of a permanent majority.

By the late 1940s, the British authorities in Nigeria might well have found themselves faced with an extremely dangerous situation. A group of young militants, members of the Zikist movement, preached the need for positive action of a revolutionary kind. But the nationalist cause was already plagued by the “tribalism” that was destined to become the most characteristic feature of Nigerian politics. Given the
vast cultural differences between North and South, political tensions could hardly have been avoided. But the situation was exacerbated by the fears felt by the Northerners that “unscrupulous” Southern politicians would use their greater familiarity with the techniques of modern politics to dominate their region, and by their resentment at the openly contemptuous attitude often displayed by Southerners to many aspects of Northern culture. No less understandable was the exasperation of many Southerners who were convinced that the process of Nigerian political development was being held back by ultra-conservative forces in the North.

The Nigerian situation as it developed during the 1950s cannot, however, be presented only in the simple terms of a conflict between North and South. Serious storms could be detected within each region. In the North, the aristocratic NPC was challenged, though with little success, by the radical Northern Elements Progressive Union. The NPC which secured the greatest success in the federal elections of 1959, winning 143 of the 312 seats, a result made possible by its control of the greater parts of Nigeria’s most populous region. Nevertheless, had NCNC and the AG decided to form an alliance, the two parties between them would have secured a convincing majority in the federal parliament. But AG-NCNC relations had been embittered by years of struggle in the Western Region. Accordingly, the NCNC decided to accept the NPC’s offer to form a coalition, leaving the AG with its apparently secure base in the Western region to form the opposition in the federal parliament. (Oyewale & Osadola, 2018) A solution of some sort had been achieved, allowing the British to make the final act in the transfer of power in October, 1960. Thus Africa’s most populous state achieved its independence.

V. CONCLUSION

I will be concluding with the implications of the replacement syndrome earlier discussed. While African thinkers accept the Western postulates, they have to employ them both to fight the colonialists and neocolonialists. For example, nationalism, a product of Western political thought, recognises the right of every people to self-determination. As such, it quickly became the ideology of independence movements in Africa as African thinkers exploited the contradictions in the concept in the colonial situation. While, on the one hand the Europeans reaffirmed their belief in the right to self-determination in the course of WW11, on the other hand they denied the Africans this universal right. The ideology of nationalism also informed Pan-Africanism which aimed not only at African unity but also at the total liberation of the African continent from colonial rule.

In the immediate post-colonial period, however, nationalism became an ideology for unity for the emerging nation-states aimed at making nationals out of the disparate peoples who made up the new artificial states. This post-colonial use easily served the African leaders’ claims to power as they became master nation-builders. Consequently, any challenge by institutionalised opposition to national unity came to be seen as inimical to the all-important task of holding the nation together. Nationalism therefore became a subtle justification for one party system.

Secondly, the replacement syndrome suggests that African political thought has little significance outside the colonial milieu. Consequently, most of the themes in African thought have had to be reviewed to be relevant in the post-colonial period. As Sklar puts it

Contemporary African theorists have pursued goals of racial emancipation, cultural development, and political independence to the end of the colonial era. Now the historic framework of colonial and anti-colonial theorizing has become an impediment that exerts negative pressures on the process of creative thought. It is largely irrelevant to the issues and problems of the post-colonial world, and restricts the scope of moral and scientific enquiry. For a conceptual breakthrough, it has become necessary to break away from the colonial/neocolonial fixation... (Sklar, 1985)

Thirdly, African political thought is marked by a wide gulf between theory and practice. The point is that as most of the theories are propounded by individual statesmen, the scope for contradictions and discontinuities in thought is quite large, especially as these statesmen move from the colonial to the post-colonial periods where the realities are markedly different. Soon after becoming independent, African statesmen found that the necessities of their new
states-economic development, political stability, and national unity—could hardly be met by the theories of anticolonialism. Fourthly, the replacement syndrome has led to the denial of whatever was alien and, therefore, European. Such denials were usually in proportion to the immediate needs of the ruling class. First, the likes of Senghor, Nyerere, Armal, and Keita have denied that classes ever existed in Africa. The inherent class struggle in capitalist societies, between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, is said to be absent from Africa. The argument is that the indigenous African society is communocratic. It was in the effort to prevent such divisions that most African leaders frowned at trade union movements. Even such a professed scientific socialist as Nkrumah, who has produced a treatise entitled Class Struggle in Africa (Nkrumah, 1970), stultified trade unionism in Ghana.

The major ideas tended to die naturally with the demise of the first-order thinkers. The fire of Pan-Africanism, for example, has tended to burn out with the death of Nkrumah who was a racial advocate of political union for African states. Taking roots in the last years of the nineteenth century, Pan-Africanism was a major theme of African thought from about 1900 to the early 1960s and was championed by such thinkers as Marcus Garvey, Edward Blyden, William Dubois, and Kwame Nkrumah. But since the formation of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963, now African Union, Pan-Africanism continue to exist only to the extent that the organisation symbolises African unity, in spite of its incipient weaknesses which result from the divergent and almost irreconcilable positions of different African states.

Finally, during the gathering of dozens of world leaders to mark the 100 years since the end of WW1, the French president echoed the thoughts of many of the European leaders who he said "patriotism is the exact opposite of nationalism. Nationalism is a betrayal of patriotism."

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